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IN THE SUPRE~1E C;QURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY G. MORLEY, 
Plainlif f, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL co=~rnus .. 
SION OF UTAH, ~\IOELE 1~· COl\. 
STRUCTION C 0 1~1 PAN Y, <cr:tl 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
11547 
The Plaintiff claims compensation arising out of 
an automobile accident that occurred on March 25, 
1966. Mr. Morley was a passenger in an automobile 
driven by one Linda Johnston. The vehicle was owned 
by the applicant; however, he claimed that Morley Con-
struction Co. reimbursed him for mileage and other ex-
1 
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penses (R. 17and18). This matter was originally heard 
by the Industrial Commission on April 27, 1967. Sub-
sequent thereto, on August 12, 1968, after the Plaintiff 
had moved to reopen, another hearing was held and 
Linda J olmston was called by the Plaintiff. The hear-
ing examiner held that the applicant at the time of the 
accident in question was not within the course of his 
employment. 
The hearing examiner held that Mr. Morley had 
left the course of his employment after he left Thel's 
Lounge with Linda Johnston ( R. 220). At the time of 
the applicant's exit from the lounge, he had with him a 
bottle of beer and according to his testimony, was taking 
Linda home for the purpose of ingratiating himself with 
the proprietress of the lounge ( R. 24). 
On State Street, the automobile, at approximately 
10909 South, veered to the right and then to the left 
across four lanes of traffic and struck a tree (R. 81 and 
82) . Prior to the accident, the applicant had placed the 
beer bottle between his legs arnVt fesult of said accident, 
the applicant received the injuries for which he is now 
claiming Workmen's Compensation benefits. The appli-
cant described his injuries as follows: 
"The injuries I sustained, it busted both of my 
legs up, it about cut my left foot off; it tore my 
rectum out about so big around (indicating) ; 
tore this left cheek all the way from the bone; 
cut me on the eye here a little bit; broke my nose. 
2 
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I had compound fractures of the right leg." (R. 
29). 
The Plaintiff in his Statement of Facts fails to 
mention that the accident was investigated by Deputy 
Sheriff Robert A. Stole. He testified that he had known 
Mr. Morley prior to the accident awl on arriving at the 
scene observed the applicant's face, and testified that 
there was lipstick on his face (R. 70), and that the lip-
stick matched that worn by Linda Johnston. 
As stated earlier, a subsequent hearing was held on 
August 12, 1968, where the applicant called Linda 
J olmston, the driver of the vehicle ( R. 132) . She 
disagreed with the applicant that he had arrived at 
Thel' s Lounge about 5 :30. She claimed that he was at 
Thel' s Lounge since 3 :00 o'clock and had danced with 
her and had bought her a "few drinks" ( R. 153) . She 
also stated that the applicant, during the time he was at 
the lounge, had been kissing her (R. 172). Another 
area of conflict between the applicant and Linda J olm-
ston was the fact that she stated that the applicant in-
sisted that she drive the automobile, whereas the appli-
cant testified that she "just jumped in" and drove the 
vehicle (R. 41). 
The hearing examiner found that Linda Johnston's 
testimony was not to be believed ( R. 220) for the reason 
that some alleged perjury charges were to be filed by 
the applicant against the witness the Plaintiff had called 
to corroborate his story (R. 220). 
3 
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In the Findings filed in the matter, the hearing 
examiner found that .Mr. Morley at the time of the acci-
dent was not within the scope of his employment. 
The examiner based his ruling, in part, on the fol-
lowing: 
(I) That Mr. Morley was not driving the vehicle 
at the time of the accident; and 
( 2) The erratic path of the vehicle prior to the 
accident; and 
( 3) The finding of lipstick on the Plaintiff at the 
scene of the accident. As to this finding, the hearing 
commissioner found ''that the lipstick on applicant's face 
was the product of an exchange between applicant and 
the patron. To find that the lipstick was that of persons 
unknown and was received without kissing goes beyond 
the pale of common sensibility." (R. 113) and found, 
therefore, in its Conclusions of Law (R. 114) that "Ap-
plicant went off on a frolic of his own, wholly unrelated 
to his business." 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID 
NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLI-
CANT WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
HIS EMPLOY1\1IENT AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
4 
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The following shows that the Industrial Commis-
sion had ample evidence to support its Order: 
(A) An in;ury which occurs when the claimant is 
doing an act for the benefit of a third person is not com-
pensable. 
It was agreed that the applicant in this case is part 
owner of the Defendant, .l\!Iorley Construction Com-
pany, and as such was afforded coverage pursuant to 
35-1-43 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. This section allows 
coverage by partners and sole proprietors. The law is 
clear, however, that a sole proprietor is covered by the 
same rules applicable to that of an employee-employer 
relationship in determining whether or not an accident 
occurred within the scope of one's employment. This 
Court has held in Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Com-
mission, 16 Utah 2d 208, 398 Pac.2d 545, that" ... inas-
much as the legislature has seen fit to include sole pro-
prietors within the compensation coverage, the same 
rules of law should be applicable to him as to any other 
employee." The applicant proceeded on the theory, by 
a self-serving statement, that the reason that he took 
Linda from the bar and permitted her to drive his ve-
hicle, was in hopes that he would ingratiate himself to 
Thel, proprietress of the lounge, thus enhancing his 
chances of getting "a bid," and that he was doing Linda 
a favor in driving her home. (R. 24) 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of 
Mr. Morley as to this fact was hindsight and not worthy 
5 
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of belief. However, assuming the statement to be accu-
rate, the question presented is whether or not a person 
is within the scope of his employment when he goes to 
the aid of a third person claiming that he was ef fectu-
a ting good public relations for his company. 
A rather recent Utah case (1964) Rowley vs. Indus-
trial Commission, et al., 15 Utah 2d 330, 392 Pac.2d 
1016, negates Plaintiff's theory in this case. A real estate 
salesman, working for a development company, went to 
a home that was in the process of completion in order to 
check the utilities. The Court found that at this point 
the claimant was within the course of his employment. 
The purchaser of the home had his car stuck in the snow 
outside of the home. In the process of walking to the 
curb in order to aid the customer, the applicant fell and 
sustained his injury. The issue presented was whether 
or not the accident which caused his injury arose out of 
his employment. The Court stated that the Plaintiff was 
in the course of his employment "with a duty to see that 
the customers were satisfied with their purchase" and 
stated, "it seems clear that he was acting within the 
course of his employment in checking the house to see if 
all the utilities were working." The Plaintiff, however, 
claimed that he was within the course of his employment 
by his "helping free the car because he had a duty to 
maintain good public relations." The Court denied the 
applicant's claim and held as follows: 
"We feel this argument without merit since 
to say such would provide a basis for any person 
6 
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injured while voluntarily helping someone, to 
claim compensation on the grounds he was main-
taining good public relations." 
Therefore, even if one was to believe Mr. Morley that 
his purpose in allowing Linda to drive the car was for 
public relations, this contention does not sustain a find-
ing that he was within the course of his employment. 
The case of Rowley vs. Industrial Commission, 
supra, sets forth the basic law that once a person acts for 
the benefit of the third person, and is injured, he is not 
entitled to Workmen's Compensation. 
At 99 C.J.S. Section 224, page 751, the following 
rule is set forth: 
"An injury incurred when the employee has 
departed from the service of the master and is 
performing a voluntary service for the accommo-
dation of another does not arise out of and in the 
course of employment; and even though the em-
ployee is performing an act which the employer 
permits him to undertake for the benefit of some 
other person or for some cause apart from the em-
ployer's own interest, the injury does not arise 
out of the employment." 
( B) At the time the applicant left the tavern there 
was a deviation from his employment so that any subse-
quent activity causing an accident could not be consid-
ered within the scope of his employment. 
The law appears clear that if one commences on a 
business trip, (which is claimed in this case by the claim-
7 
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ant in going to Thel' s Lounge in order to make a bid) 
and deviates from such purpose and is injured, he is not 
within the course of his employment. An early and lead-
ing case in the area of workmen's compensation law is 
Sullivan v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 317, 10 Pac. 
2d 924. Sullivan was injured at Poughkeepsie when he 
stopped to visit his daughter at Vassar College while on 
a company business trip travelling from Salt Lake City 
to New York. Sullivan claimed compensation and pre-
sented in essence the same theory claimed here - that 
is, as a general manager of a railroad company and be-
ing away from home, he is within the scope of his agency 
while on ~aid trip. He argued that his activities in stop-
ping at Vassar were reasonably incident to his business 
trip because it was, of course, necessary that one stop 
and rest during the course of such trip. The Supreme 
Court held that the applicant was not within the course 
of his employment. This case clearly negates the appli-
cant's claim that he is on duty when he is away from 
home. Therefore, the mere fact that the claimant was an 
occupant of a vehicle that was used for company pur-
poses at the time of the accident is insufficient to sustain 
an award for compensation benefits. 
The applicant has cited two cases to sustain his po-
sition in this regard. They are Stroud vs. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270; 272 Pac. 2d 187, and Twin 
Peaks Canning Company vs. Industrial Commission, 57 
Utah 589; 196 Pacific 853. It is respectfully submitted 
that these cases are of no aid to the applicant in this fact 
8 
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situation. In both of these cases the accident occurred 
while on the premises of the employer. lt is axiomatic 
aud has long been held that accidents even caused by 
"horseplay" on the premises are compensable. The issue 
presented in this case does not, however, concern the 
same policy argument that gives rise to the "on the 
premise" type of fact situation. 
( C) The applicant failed to present sufficient evi-
dence that at the time of the accident he was in the per-
formance of his duties. 
It is fundamental that in determining whether one 
is within the scope of his employment, the first test is 
whether or not the activities of the claimant at the time 
of the accident were within his duties for his employer. 
The record is void of any evidence which would in any 
manner show a connection between the claimant's duties 
with Morley Construction Company and allowing Linda 
to drive his vehicle. As has been referred to earlier in 
Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Commission supra, the 
fact that the applicant is both employer and employee 
does not negate the general rules of workmen's compen-
sation. Compensation is only allowed when at the time 
of the accident the employee is within the scope of his 
duties. 
This Court has reviewed in Board of Education of 
Logan City, et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, ct 
al, 102 Utah 504, 132 Pac. 2d 381, the necessary eviden-
9 
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tial requirements the claimant must present to sustain a 
finding that he was within the course of his employment 
when engaged in peripheral activities. 
In this case, the Court was presented with a situa-
tion wherein the applicant claimed compensation be-
cause he was, according to his argument, effectuating 
good will which would result to the benefit of his em-
ployer. It should be pointed out that in this case the facts 
were not as bizarre as in the present case. In the Board 
of Education case, supra, the applicant was employed as 
a ~chool teacher and one of his duties was the joining of 
a recreation council. After making a speech in a sur-
rounding community on "recreation," and when return-
ing home, he was involved in an accident. The applicant 
proceeded on the theory that this promotional activity 
of giving speeches would create good will for his em-
ployer and fell within the scope of his duties and there-
fore he was covered at the time of the accident. The Su-
preme Court held that there were insufficient facts to 
sustain an award in that there was no evidence that his 
duties required him to participate in this outside activity. 
Certainly, in the Board of Education case the promot-
ing of activities of recreation inured to the benefit of his 
employer, however, the Court ruled that there were no 
facts to show that this was his duty. 
We submit that this case clearly shows that appli-
cant's theory is invalid, that is, that any activity which in 
any manner may benefit the employer is sufficient to 
10 
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sustain an award. As stated aforesaid, there is no evi-
dence in the record that l\fr. Morley's duties were to 
extend rides to third persons and certainly the rather 
tenuous position that this actvity could in some manner 
be helpful to the employer is insufficient. 
In summary, the record is silent that the partner-
ship entity of Morely Construction Company assigned 
Mr. Morley the duty of allowing Linda to drive the 
company vehicle. 
(D) That the deviation in this case involved risks 
which were causually related to the accident and as such 
the applicant was not within the scope of his employ-
ment. 
In analyzing deviation cases it appears clear that 
when the deviation itself contributes causually to the 
risk which caused the accident the Courts are justifiably 
reluctant in granting compensation. Therefore, the ap .. 
plicant' s act of allowing a stranger to drive his vehicle 
and the careless act of carrying a bottle of beer between 
his legs itself would negate one's claim for compensation. 
Larson on Workmen's Compensation Law, Volume I, 
page 294.94, Section 19.61, succinctly set forth the rule 
applicable in these situations. Larson states: 
"If the incidents of the deviation itself are 
operative in producing the accident, this in itself 
will weigh heavily on the side of non-compensa-
11 
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bility, as in the Conklin case, (312 l\lich. 250, 20 
N.VV. 2d 179 ( 1945)) in which the very act of 
stopping to see the personal friend caused the 
rearend collision of the two trucks, and as the 
Colwell case ( 309 S.,V. 2d 350, Ky. 1958) in 
which the act of crossing the road to tow a 
brother-in-law's car with a coal truck led to the 
accident. 
Also related to this factor is the argument 
used in the Public Service Company case, (395 
Ill. 238, 69 N.E. 2d 875 ( 1946)) that by virtue 
of the deviation the employee introduced the haz-
ard of having to cross and recross dangerous rail-
road tracks which were not a hazard of his regu-
lar route. 
Again, in Stephens vs. Young, ( 115 Ohio App. 
13, 184 N.E. 2d 112 (1961)) the causal element 
added by the deviation was a new-found friend. 
After a few beers at two taverns, a route sales-
man accepted a ride with the new friend to re-
trieve a forgotten route book. The tavern ac-
quaintance hit him over the head and stole his 
preYious day's collections. 
And in Sun Insurance Company vs. Boyd, 
( 101 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1958) ) the deviation su-
perimposed uron the employment the clearly un-
related risk of climbing a ladder to retrieve a 
hammer from a scaffolding a_t home. 
In the prolific category of deviations involving 
drinking, the fact that the drinking usually com-
bined with driving, in itself added a notorious 
hazard and has undoubtedly been a factor in 
some denials of compensation, whether specific-
ally mentioned or not. 
12 
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Larson also discusses the factual situation where 
the employer was mixing pleasure with business. In this 
regard Larson on 'V orkmen's Compensation Law sets 
forth the appropriate rule at Volume I, page 294.45, 
Section 18.41 as follows: 
"We have seen the application of the mixed-
purpose doctrine of out-of-town trips and to the 
journey between the employee's home and job. 
The same doctrine is helpful in disentangling 
various other problems in which the mixing of 
business and pleasure casts doubt on the char-
acter of the employee's errand at the time of in-
JUry. 
One such situation is that of the salesman who, 
having spent the evening in a tavern, and having 
been injured on his way home, testifies that he 
tried to sell the bartender a car in the course of 
the evening. In two cases of this kind, 'Visconsin 
has denied compensation on the ground that car-
selling was entirely incidental (Price vs. Shore-
wood ~I otors, Inc., 214 'Vis. 64, 251 N.,V. 244 
(1933)) even when the claimant contended that 
he had gone somewhat out of his way to make the 
call. (Fawcett vs. Gallery, 21 'Vis. 195, 265 
N.,V. 667 (1936)). In a comparable situation, 
the Wisconsin court rejected a service station 
employee's contention that at time of injury, 
which was 3 :30 a.m., he was road-checking the 
car for his female companion, a night club enter-
tainer who at the time was apparently intoxi-
cated. (Hermans vs. Industrial Commission, 266 
'Vis. 100. 62 N.,v. 2d 406 (1954)). 
In a Minnesota case, (McCarty vs. Twin City 
Egg & Poultry Ass'n., 172 Minn. 551, 216 N.,V. 
13 
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239) au employee left his home about 10 :00 at 
night with a drunken companion and drove 15 
miles to a restaurant, for the purpose, he said, of 
seeing the restaurant-keeper on business of his 
employer. 
The court said : 
'That a servant with a fixed salary should of 
his own motion start out on work for his employer 
after 10 o'clock at night and invite a drunken per-
son as a companion is not the ordinary occur-
rence. \Vhen, in addition thereto, it is considered 
that in the morning relator would necessarily pass 
Hugo in going to employer's office for instruc-
tion as to the day's work, it seems incredible that 
he should have taken a journey some 15 miles 
late at night to iuteniew a restaurant keep at 
Hugh.' 
It may be observed that in these cases, as in 
most of the unsuccessful cases, the evidence of 
actual perfonnance of a business function is at 
best weal-;; and at worst has the distinct earmarks 
of an afterthought. \Vhen an insurance salesman, 
who had gone on several weekend trips with a 
friend to see game-cock fighting, was injured re-
turning from such trip and asserted that he had 
discussed insurance with his friend during the 
trip, it is difficult, under the rule in Marks vs. 
Gray, to conclude that the business trip would 
have gone forward although the personal mo-
tive had failed." (Emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The applicant in his brief points out that "at the 
14 
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first blush" it appears that "Mr. Morley was in fact on 
a frolic of his own, to-wit: having some type of liason or 
affair with Linda Johnston. Nothing is further from 
the fact or truth. People, being human, are prone to 
think the worst of their fellow man and jump to what 
they think are valid assumption." 'Vithout making any 
imputations it appears safe to say that the claim of ap-
plicant for compensation in this case is based upon a 
rather bizarre set of facts. The claim that Mr. Morley 
was attempting to bring about good will for his business 
entity seems somewhat weak. The facts are simple: He 
left the lounge with a beer which at the time of the acci-
dent was tucked between his legs, with a young girl who 
he claimed insisted upon driving, and was involved in 
an accident where the path of the automobile was quite 
erratic and where the investigating officer noted lipstick 
on his face after the accident. It appears therefore that 
the Industrial Commission was justified in believing 
that the applicant was not within the scope of his em-
ployment at the time of accident. It also appears that the 
Industrial Commission was not arbitrary and capricious 
in its order for the following reasons: 
(A) An injury which occurs when the claimant is 
doing an act for the benefit of a third person is not com-
pensable. 
( B) At the time the applicant left the tavern there 
was a deviation from his employment so that any subse-
quent activity causing an accident could not be con-
15 
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sidered within the scope of his employment. 
( C) The applicant failed to present sufficient evi-
dence that at the time of the accident he was in the per-
formance of his duties. 
(D) That the deviation in this case involved risks 
which were causjally related to the accident and as such 
the applicant was not within the scope of his employ-
ment. 
The Industrial Commission's denial of the award 
is sustained by the evidence. 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Defendants 
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